Full-Duplex Bidirectional Secure Communications under Perfect and
  Distributionally Ambiguous Eavesdropper's CSI by Li, Qiang et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
07
33
7v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
3 M
ay
 20
17
1
Full-Duplex Bidirectional Secure Communications
under Perfect and Distributionally Ambiguous
Eavesdropper’s CSI
Qiang Li, Member, IEEE, Ying Zhang, Jingran Lin, Member, IEEE, and Sissi Xiaoxiao Wu, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Consider a full-duplex (FD) bidirectional secure
communication system, where two communication nodes, named
Alice and Bob, simultaneously transmit and receive confidential
information from each other, and an eavesdropper, named
Eve, overhears the transmissions. Our goal is to maximize the
sum secrecy rate (SSR) of the bidirectional transmissions by
optimizing the transmit covariance matrices at Alice and Bob.
To tackle this SSR maximization (SSRM) problem, we develop
an alternating difference-of-concave (ADC) programming
approach to alternately optimize the transmit covariance
matrices at Alice and Bob. We show that the ADC iteration has
a semi-closed-form beamforming solution, and is guaranteed to
converge to a stationary solution of the SSRM problem. Besides
the SSRM design, this paper also deals with a robust SSRM
transmit design under a moment-based random channel state
information (CSI) model, where only some roughly estimated
first and second-order statistics of Eve’s CSI are available, but
the exact distribution or other high-order statistics is not known.
This moment-based error model is new and different from the
widely used bounded-sphere error model and the Gaussian
random error model. Under the consider CSI error model, the
robust SSRM is formulated as an outage probability-constrained
SSRM problem. By leveraging the Lagrangian duality theory
and DC programming, a tractable safe solution to the robust
SSRM problem is derived. The effectiveness and the robustness
of the proposed designs are demonstrated through simulations.
Index terms− Physical-layer security, full-duplex communication,
DC programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is known that full-duplex (FD) communication has
a potential to double spectral efficiency via simultaneous
transmission and reception (STR) over the same frequency
band. With recent success in developing FD communication
prototypes [2]–[4], there is a renewed interest in FD stud-
ies [5]–[13]. Among these, exploiting full duplexity to enhance
physical-layer (PHY) security has received considerable atten-
tion.
Part of this work has been published in IEEE GLOBECOM 2016 [1].
This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation
of China under Grants (61401073, 61531009, 61671120), and in part by
the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant
(ZYGX2016J011).
Q. Li, Y. Zhang and J. Lin are with School of Communication
and Information Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Tech-
nology of China, Chengdu, P. R. China. E-mails: lq@uestc.edu.cn,
201422010638@std.uestc.edu.cn, jingranlin@uestc.edu.cn
S. X. Wu is with the College of Information Engineering, Shenzhen
University, Shenzhen, P. R. China. E-mail: xxwu.eesissi@gmail.com.
PHY security is an information theoretical approach to
achieving confidentiality at the PHY [14]. A key performance
measure of PHY security is the secrecy rate — at which
the confidential information can be securely and successfully
transmitted from the source to the legitimate destination. By
exploiting full duplexity at the transceiver, it will not only help
improve the secrecy rate, but also provides more flexibility
for system designs. To be specific, the work [5] studied a
point-to-point secure communication, where an FD target user
simultaneously receives information from the transmitter and
sends artificial noise (AN) to block the eavesdropper. It is
shown that higher secrecy rate can be achieved as compared
with the conventional transmitter side jamming strategy, owing
to a priori knowledge of AN or self interference (SI) at the
receiver. Following this idea, the work [6] further studied
antenna configurations for information reception and AN gen-
eration at the FD receiver. Besides the one-way transmission,
two-way secrecy designs were considered in [7], [8] under
both perfect and imperfect channel state information (CSI) of
the eavesdropper. A semidefinite programming (SDP)-based
search approach was proposed to maximize the two-way sum
secrecy rate (SSR). The result shows that for well suppressed
SI, FD has a better secrecy performance than half duplex.
Recently, FD relay secure communications also gained much
interest. In [9], the authors considered an adaptive FD one-
way relay network, where the relay can work under either
the FD transmission (FDT) mode or the FD jamming (FDJ)
mode, depending on the residual SI level and the relative
channel quality between the target user and the eavesdropper.
In our recent work [10], a joint FDT and FDJ relaying scheme
based on Alamouti rank-two beamforming was proposed to
enhance PHY security for an FD two-way relay network.
Full duplexity also provides flexibility for secrecy design in
cellular networks. By assuming full duplexity at the base
station (BS), the uplink (respectively downlink) transmission
can be protected from eavesdropping by deliberately sending
AN in the downlink (respectively uplink) transmission. This
idea was applied in [11] and [12] for uplink-downlink SSR
maximization and power minimization respectively (resp.), and
more recently was generalized to the simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) scenario [13].
In this work, we focus on the FD bidirectional secure com-
munications, where two FD legitimate nodes, named Alice and
Bob, exchange confidential information, and an eavesdropper,
named Eve, overhears the transmissions. Assuming that Alice
and Bob both have N transmit antennas and one receive
2antenna, we aim to optimize the transmit covariance matrices
at Alice and Bob so that the sum secrecy rate (SSR) of the
bidirectional transmissions is maximized. This sum secrecy
rate maximization (SSRM) problem is nonconvex and involves
two matrix variables of dimension N -by-N . By carefully
examining the SSRM problem structure, we first show that the
variables’ dimension can be reduced from N -by-N to 3-by-3.
Based on this dimension-reduced formulation, an alternating
difference-of-concave (ADC) programming approach is pro-
posed to iteratively optimize the transmit covariance matrices.
In particular, we custom-derive a semi-closed-form solution
for each ADC iteration and show that the ADC approach is
guaranteed to converge to a stationary solution of the SSRM
problem.
Besides the SSRM problem, we also study a robust SSRM
problem by assuming imperfect CSI of Eve. In the existing
robust secrecy studies, there are two popular robust models,
namely, the bounded-sphere model [8], [15] and the Gaussian
random model [16]–[18]. In this paper, we depart from the
aforementioned models and consider another moment-based
random CSI model; that is, only some roughly estimated first
and second-order statistics of Eve’s CSI are available, but
the exact distribution and other high-order statistics are not
known. Such a model is motivated by the observation that
it is relatively easier to estimate the mean and covariance
than the complete distribution. Under this moment-based CSI
model, we aim to maximize the SSR while keeping the
secrecy outage probability, evaluated with respect to (w.r.t.)
any distribution fulfilling the estimated first and second-order
statistics, below a given threshold. The considered robust
SSRM formulation has two distinguishing features: 1) It does
not require full knowledge of Eve’s CSI distribution, thus
bypassing the troublesome distribution modeling problem. 2)
it renders a secrecy design that is immune to variations
of the distribution, thus providing a distributionally robust
secrecy outage probability guarantee. The latter is particularly
important for PHY security, where the information leakage
should be stringently controlled in a worst-case sense. Despite
its attractive features, the robust SSRM problem is, however,
challenging to solve, because the outage probability generally
has no closed form; even if it has, the resulting constraint
is likely to be non-convex. Moreover, the outage probability
should be satisfied for infinite-many distributions with given
first and second-order statistics, which thus gives rise to an
infinite number of probabilistic constraints. To handle these
difficulties, we employ the Lagrangian duality theory [19] (see
also [20]) and the DC programming to derive a tractable safe
solution for the robust SSRM problem.
A. Related Works
There are some related works worth mentioning. In [7],
[8], the authors considered similar secrecy design problems
under both perfect and imperfect CSI of Eve. Our work
differs from [7], [8] in both problem formulation and solution
approach. Specifically, for the perfect CSI case the work [7]
considered the SSRM problem under a single total power con-
straint, and proposed an SDP-based two-dimensional search
approach and some low-complexity solutions to the SSRM
problem. Herein, we consider the SSRM under the individual
power constraints on Alice and Bob. Because of the individual
power constraints, the approach in [7] is not applicable. For the
imperfect CSI case, our moment-based random CSI model is
different from the bounded-sphere model in [8]. Consequently,
a completely different robust SSRM formulation as well as the
solution method are sought.
B. Organization and Notations
This paper is organized as follows. The system model
and problem statement are given in Section II. Section III
focuses on the SSRM problem under the perfect CSI case
and develops an alternating DC approach. Section IV studies
the robust SSRM problem under the imperfect CSI case, and
develops a robust DC approach. Simulation results comparing
the proposed designs are illustrated in Section V. Section VI
concludes the paper.
Our notations are as follows. (·)T and (·)H denote the
transpose and conjugate transpose, resp.; I denotes an identity
matrix with an appropriate dimension; 1N represents a length-
N vector with each entry being one; HN+ (resp. H
N
++) denotes
the set of all N -by-N Hermitian positive semidefinite (resp.
positive definite) matrices; A  0 means that A is Hermitian
positive semidefinite, and A  0 means that −A is Hermitian
positive semidefinite;Diag(A, B) represents a block diagonal
matrix with the diagonal blocks A and B; Tr(·) denotes a
trace operation; [·]+ , max{0, ·}; CN (a,Σ) represents a
complex Gaussian distribution with mean a and covariance
matrix Σ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
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Fig. 1. System model
Consider a full-duplex bidirectional secure communication
system depicted in Fig. 1, where two legitimate nodes, named
Alice and Bob, exchange confidential information, and an
eavesdropper, named Eve, overhears the transmissions. We
assume that Alice and Bob both work in the full-duplex mode,
i.e., Alice (resp. Bob) can simultaneously transmit information
to and receive from Bob (resp. Alice). Alice and Bob both
have N transmit antennas and one receive antenna. Eve has a
single antenna; extension to multiple multiantenna Eves will
be considered in Section III-D. Let hab ∈ CN , hae ∈ CN
3and haa ∈ CN be channels from Alice to Bob, Eve and Alice
herself, resp.; hba ∈ CN , hbe ∈ CN and hbb ∈ CN are defined
similarly. Then, the received signal at Alice can be expressed
as
ya(t) = h
H
baxb(t) + h
H
aaxa(t) + na(t), (1)
where na(t) ∼ CN (0, σ2a) is circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian noise at Alice; xa(t) ∈ CN and xb(t) ∈ CN
are coded confidential information sent by Alice and Bob,
resp. According to [14], we have xa(t) ∼ CN (0,Qa) and
xb(t) ∼ CN (0,Qb) with Qa  0 and Qb  0 being the
transmit covariance matrices. The second term on the right-
hand side of (1) is SI induced by the full-duplex operation.
Ideally, the SI can be completely eliminated by exploiting a
priori knowledge of xa(t) at Alice. However, in practice, it
can be only suppressed to some extent, owing to high SI power
and hardware limitations, e.g., limited dynamic range. As such,
the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at
Alice after SI suppression may be expressed as
SINRa(Qa,Qb) =
hHbaQbhba
σ2a + ζah
H
aaQahaa
where 0 < ζa < 1 denotes the SI residual factor, which reflects
the residual SI power level after SI suppression. Accordingly,
the achievable rate at Alice is given by
Ra(Qa,Qb) = log(1 + SINRa(Qa,Qb)), (2)
where we have treated the residual SI as Gaussian noise.
Similarly, the SINR at Bob is given by
SINRb(Qa,Qb) =
hHabQahab
σ2b + ζbh
H
bbQbhbb
,
and the achievable rate is
Rb(Qa,Qb) = log(1 + SINRb(Qa,Qb)). (3)
As for Eve, by using the two-user multiple access channel
capacity result [21], its sum rate can be upper bounded by
Re(Qa,Qb) = log
(
1 +
hHaeQahae + h
H
beQbhbe
σ2e
)
. (4)
Hence, according to [22] the sum secrecy rate of the bidirec-
tional transmissions is expressed as
Rs(Qa,Qb) = [Ra(Qa,Qb)+Rb(Qa,Qb)−Re(Qa,Qb)]+.
Our problem of interest is to jointly optimize Qa and Qb
such that the sum secrecy rate is maximized, viz.,
max
Qa,Qb
Rs(Qa,Qb) (5a)
(SSRM) s.t. Tr(Qa) ≤ Pa, Qa  0, (5b)
Tr(Qb) ≤ Pb, Qb  0, (5c)
where Pa > 0 and Pb > 0 denote the total transmit power
budget at Alice and Bob, resp.
III. A TRACTABLE APPROACH TO PROBLEM (5)
A. Reformulation of Problem (5)
In (5), the variables’ dimension is N -by-N . By exploiting
the problem structure, problem (5) can be recast into a form
with the variables’ dimension of 3-by-3. Specifically, from the
objective (5a), it is not hard to see that the optimal Qa must
lie in the subspace spanned by Ha , [hab, haa, hae]. This
is because Ra, Rb and Re depend on Qa through h
H
aaQahaa,
hHabQahab and h
H
aeQahae, resp. If Qa has any component
outside the range space of Ha, we can project the former
onto the latter without changing the objective value in (5a).
Therefore, without loss of optimality, we can set
Qa = UaWaU
H
a (6)
for some Wa ∈ H3+. Here, Ua ∈ CN×3 is any semi-unitary
matrix spanning the same subspace as Ha, which can be
obtained by standard Gram-Schmidt process. Similarly, the
optimal Qb is given by
Qb = UbWbU
H
b (7)
for someWb ∈ H3+, where Ub ∈ CN×3 spans the same range
space as Hb , [hba, hbb, hbe].
Using (6) and (7), problem (5) can be equivalently expressed
as
max
Wa∈H3,Wb∈H3
R˜a(Wa,Wb) + R˜b(Wa,Wb)− R˜e(Wa,Wb)
s.t. Tr(Wa) ≤ Pa, Wa  0,
Tr(Wb) ≤ Pb, Wa  0,
(8)
where
R˜a(Wa,Wb) = log
(
1 +
h˜HbaWbh˜ba
σ2a + ζah˜
H
aaWah˜aa
)
,
R˜b(Wa,Wb) = log
(
1 +
h˜HabWah˜ab
σ2b + ζbh˜
H
bbWbh˜bb
)
,
R˜e(Wa,Wb) = log
(
1 +
h˜HaeWah˜ae + h˜
H
beWbh˜be
σ2e
)
,
and h˜ij , U
H
i hij ∈ C3, ∀ i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {a, b, e}.
By comparing (8) with (5), the number of variables has
been reduced to 18 real variables. However, computing these
optimal 18 variables is still a challenging task, owing to the
highly nonlinear objective. In the sequel, we propose a sub-
optimal, yet computationally efficient approach to problem (8)
by using alternating optimization and the DC programming.
B. An Alternating DC Approach to Problem (8)
Since it is hard to jointly optimize Wa and Wb, a natural
idea is to alternately optimizing Wa and Wb. Suppose that
at the kth iteration we have obtained (W ka ,W
k
b ). Then, we
alternately solve the following two problems
W k+1a ∈ argmax
Wa
{
R˜a(Wa,W
k
b ) + R˜b(Wa,W
k
b )
− R˜e(Wa,W kb )
}
s.t. Tr(Wa) ≤ Pa, Wa  0,
(9)
4and
W k+1b ∈ argmax
Wb
{
R˜a(W
k+1
a ,Wb) + R˜b(W
k+1
a ,Wb)
− R˜e(W k+1a ,Wb)
}
s.t. Tr(Wb) ≤ Pb, Wb  0,
(10)
for k = 1, 2, . . . until some stopping criterion is satisfied.
By directly applying the convergence result [24] of block-
coordinate descent (BCD) with two blocks, the following fact
is readily obtained.
Fact 1 ([24]) Suppose that {(W ka ,W kb )}k is a sequence gen-
erated by alternately solving (9) and (10). Then, every limit
point of {(W ka ,W kb )}k is a stationary point of problem (8).
We should mention that the above alternating optimization
requires solving each subproblem in (9) and (10) optimally.
However, one can verify that the subproblems in (9) and (10)
are still nonconvex. In particular, the objective in (9) is a
difference of concave (DC) functions, whereby R˜b(Wa,W
k
b )
is concave w.r.t. Wa, but R˜a(Wa,W
k
b ) − R˜e(Wa,W kb ) is
convex. A similar observation applies to (10). A widely-
used approach to handle this kind of problem is the DC
programming, i.e., by locally linearizing the nonconcave part
R˜a(Wa,W
k
b )− R˜e(Wa,W kb ) to get a convex approximation
of problem (9). This motivates us to consider an alternating
DC (ADC) approach to problem (8); see Algorithm 1. Note
Algorithm 1 An ADC Approach to Problem (8)
1: Set k = 0 and initialize (W 0a ,W
0
b )
2: repeat
W k+1a ∈ arg max
Wa0
fa(Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b )
s.t. Tr(Wa) ≤ Pa,
(11)
3:
W k+1b ∈ arg max
Wb0
fb(Wb;W
k+1
a ,W
k
b )
s.t. Tr(Wb) ≤ Pb,
(12)
4: k = k + 1;
5: until Some stopping criterion is satisfied
that in (11) and (12), we have defined
fa(Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b )
,R˜b(Wa,W
k
b ) + R˜a(W
k
a ,W
k
b )− R˜e(W ka ,W kb )
+Tr
(
∇Wa [R˜a(W ka ,W kb )− R˜e(W ka ,W kb )]H(Wa −W ka )
)
fb(Wb;W
k+1
a ,W
k
b )
,R˜a(W
k+1
a ,Wb) + R˜b(W
k+1
a ,W
k
b )− R˜e(W k+1a ,W kb )
+Tr
(
∇Wb [R˜b(W k+1a ,W kb )− R˜e(W k+1a ,W kb )]H(Wb −W kb )
)
.
In steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1, we need to solve two con-
vex optimization problems, which in principle can be done by
invoking some general purpose optimization softwares, such
as CVX [25]. However, by carefully inspecting the problem
structure, we are able to custom-derive more efficient solutions
for problems (9) and (10), as detailed in the next subsection.
C. Semi-closed-form Solutions for Problems (11) and (12)
Let us focus on problem (11) and the other one can be
handled similarly. After dropping some terms irrespective of
Wa, problem (11) is simplified as
max
Wa0
log(1 + hˆHabWahˆab)− Tr(MaWa)
s.t. Tr(Wa) ≤ Pa,
(13)
where hˆab andMa are defined in (14). Let us consider solving
the dual of problem (13), which is given by
min
λa≥0
{
max
Wa0
L(Wa, λa)
}
, (15)
where L(Wa, λa) , log(1 + hˆHabWahˆab) − Tr(MaWa) −
λa(Tr(Wa) − Pa) is the partial Lagrangian of problem (13),
and λa ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the
power constraint. Depending on the relationship between hˆab
and Ma, we consider the solution of (15) in the following
two cases, namely, hˆab /∈ R{Ma} and hˆab ∈ R{Ma}, where
R{Ma} denotes the range space spanned by Ma.
1) Case 1: hˆab /∈ R{Ma}: In such a case, any dual
feasible λa of (15) must be strictly positive, because for
λa = 0, we can always find some v such that Mav = 0
and hˆHabv 6= 0. It is easy to verify that L(ζvvH , 0) → ∞ as
ζ →∞; that is λa = 0 is dual infeasible for (15). In view of
this, we charaterize the primal-dual optimal solution of (15)
as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose hˆab /∈ R{Ma}. The optimal W ⋆a of
(13) is given by
W ⋆a = κa(Ma + λ
⋆
aI)
−1hˆabhˆ
H
ab(Ma + λ
⋆
aI)
−1, (16)
where κa =
[
1−‖(Ma+λ
⋆
aI)
−1/2hˆab‖
−2
]+
‖(Ma+λ⋆aI)
−1/2hˆab‖2
and λ⋆a is the dual
optimal solution satisfying 0 < λ⋆a < ‖hˆab‖2. Moreover, λ⋆a
can be efficiently computed via bisection such that Tr(W ⋆a ) =
Pa holds.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Some remarks on Proposition 1 are in order:
Remark 1 Under the assumption of hˆab /∈ R{Ma}, the
transmitter must transmit with full power. Intuitively, this is
reasonable because if there is remaining power, one can utilize
it and send information in the null space of Ma, which may
further improve the objective of (13).
Remark 2 The optimal W ⋆a has a rank-one structure, and
thus the ADC algorithm can be implemented with the simple
transmit beamforming. Moreover, the beamformer
√
κa(Ma+
λ⋆aI)
−1hˆab has an interesting connection with the MMSE-
based transmit beamforming in interfering channels (IC) [26].
In particular, if we treat hˆab as the target channel from the
transmitter to Bob, and hˆaa and hˆae as interfering channels
to Alice herself and Eve, resp. Then, Ma is exactly the
sum of the covariance matrices of interferences seen at Alice
and Eve. Therefore, the beamforming solution
√
κa(Ma +
5hˆab = (σ
2
b + ζbh˜
H
bbW
k
b h˜bb)
−1/2h˜ab, hˆaa =
√
ζa/(h˜HbaW
k
b h˜ba)h˜aa, hˆae = h˜ae/
√
σ2e + h˜
H
beW
k
b h˜be, σˆ
2
a = σ
2
a/(h˜
H
baW
k
b h˜ba)
Ma =
hˆaahˆ
H
aa
(1 + σˆ2a + hˆ
H
aaW
k
a hˆaa)(σˆ
2
a + hˆ
H
aaW
k
a hˆaa)
+
hˆaehˆ
H
ae
1 + hˆHaeW
k
a hˆae
(14)
λ⋆aI)
−1hˆab trades off the target user’s reception and “interfer-
ence” suppression at (or information leakage to) co-channel
users. Specifically, it can be easily shown that when the co-
channels are absent, i.e., hˆaa = hˆae = 0, the beamformer
degenerates into the maximum ratio transmission (MRT). On
the other hand, when the intensities of the co-channels are
extremely strong, the optimal beamforming approaches zero-
forcing beamforming.
Remark 3 The rank-one structure of W ⋆a is not only physi-
cally meaningful, it also plays a key role in pining down the
convergence of the ADC algorithm. We will detail this later
in Proposition 3.
2) Case 2: hˆab ∈ R{Ma}: In such a case, the dual feasible
solution λa is not necessarily strictly positive. Nevertheless,
since hˆab ∈ R{Ma} and the objective of (13) depends on
Wa through hˆab andMa, without loss of optimality, we may
assume that the optimal W ⋆a lies in the range space of Ma,
for otherwise we can projectW ⋆a onto the range space ofMa
and attains the same optimal value with less power. LetMa =
FaΣaF
H
a be the economy SVD of Ma with Fa ∈ C3×2 and
Σa ∈ H2++. Then, the optimal W ⋆a takes the following form:
W ⋆a = FaX
⋆
aF
H
a (17)
for some X⋆a ∈ H2+. Using (17), problem (13) is simplified as
max
Xa∈H2+
log(1 + hˆHabFaXaF
H
a hˆab)− Tr(ΣaXa)
s.t. Tr(Xa) ≤ Pa.
(18)
By noting that Σa ≻ 0, a similar result like Proposition 1 can
be easily deduced.
Proposition 2 Suppose hˆab ∈ R{Ma}. The optimal W ⋆a of
(13) is given by (17) with X⋆a computed as
X⋆a = κ˜a(Σa + λ
⋆
aI)
−1FHa hˆabhˆ
H
abFa(Σa + λ
⋆
aI)
−1, (19)
where κ˜a =
[
1−‖(Σa+λ
⋆
aI)
−1/2FHa hˆab‖
−2
]+
‖(Σa+λ⋆aI)
−1/2FHa hˆab‖
2
and λ⋆a ≥ 0 is the
optimal dual variable associated with the power constraint in
(18). Moreover, λ⋆a can be efficiently computed via bisection
such that the complementarity condition λ⋆a(Tr(X
⋆
a)−Pa) = 0
is satisfied.
Proof. Notice that Σa ≻ 0 implies that Σa+λ⋆aI is invertible,
whenever λ⋆a ≥ 0. Then, the remaining proof is exactly the
same as Proposition 1, and thus omitted for brevity. 
Let us examine the convergence issue of the ADC algorithm.
The ADC algorithm is somehow a mixture of the BCD method
and the DC programming, but neither of their convergence
results applies. By linking the ADC algorithm to the block
successive upper-bound minimization (BSUM) algorithm in
[23], the following convergence result of the ADC algorithm
can be readily established.
Proposition 3 The sequence {(W ka ,W kb )}k generated by
Algorithm 1 must have at least one limit point. Moreover,
every limit point of {(W ka ,W kb )}k is a stationary solution
of problem (8).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
D. Extensions
The proposed ADC algorithm can be adapted to more
complex eavesdropping scenarios. Below, we showcase some
possible extensions.
1) Multiple Alice-Bob pairs: Consider interfering channels
with K pairs of Alice-Bob links. Let hai,bj be the channel
from the ith Alice to the jth Bob, and Qai be the transmit
covariance of the ith Alice. hai,e, hbi,aj and Qbi are defined
similarly. The rate of the ith Alice is
Rai({Qak ,Qbk}Kk=1) =
log
(
1 +
hHbi,aiQbihbi,ai
σ2ai + ζaih
H
aiQaihai +
∑
j 6=i,x∈{a,b}
hHxj ,aiQxjhxj ,ai
)
The ith Bob’s rate Rbi({Qak ,Qbk}Kk=1) can be calculated
similarly. The Eve’s sum rate is given by
Re({Qak ,Qbk}Kk=1)
= log
(
1 +
∑K
i=1 h
H
ai,eQaihai,e + h
H
bi,e
Qbihbi,e
σ2e
)
.
Then, the sum secrecy rate is written as
Rs({Qak ,Qbk}Kk=1) = [(
∑K
i=1Rai + Rbi) − Re]+. Since
there are multiple Qai and Qbi , it is straightforward to extend
the previous two-block ADC algorithm to 2K-block ADC.
In particular, we cyclically optimize Qxi for x ∈ {a, b}
and i = 1, . . . ,K . When fixing any 2K − 1 variables and
optimizing the remaining one, the resultant secrecy rate
maximization problem is similar to problem (9). Hence, the
DC programing and the fast solutions in Propositions 1 and 2
can be directly applied. Moreover, the stationary convergence
claim is still valid by noting that the BSUM convergence
conditions still hold for K ≥ 2.
2) Multiple multiantenna Eves: The ADC algorithm can be
adapted to multiple multiantenna Eves. For simplicity, we still
assume one pair of Alice-Bob; extension to multiple pairs is
straightforward. Let Haei ∈ CN×Li (resp. Hbei ∈ CN×Li)
be the channel from Alice to the ith Eve (resp. Bob to the ith
6Mi =
hˆaahˆ
H
aa
(1 + σˆ2a + hˆ
H
aaW
k
a hˆaa)(σˆ
2
a + hˆ
H
aaW
k
a hˆaa)
+ H˜aei(σ
2
eiI + H˜
H
aeiW
k
a H˜aei + H˜
H
beiW
k
b H˜bei)
−1H˜Haei (23)
Eve), with Li being the number of antennas at Eve i. Then,
the rate at the ith Eve is given by
Rei(Qa,Qb) = log |I + σ−2ei (HHaeiQaHaei +HHbeiQbHbei)|
for i = 1, . . . , I . The sum secrecy rate is written as
Rs(Qa,Qb)
= min
i=1,...,I
{Ra(Qa,Qb) +Rb(Qa,Qb)−Rei(Qa,Qb)}.
It is easy to verify that under the multiple multiantenna Eve’s
case, the dimension reduction and the ADC algorithm is still
applicable. In particular, by using the same notations as in
Sec. III-A, the DC subproblem (11) is modified as:
max
Wa0
min
i=1,...,I
log(1 + hˆHabWahˆab)− Tr(MiWa)
s.t. Tr(Wa) ≤ Pa,
(20)
where Mi is defined in (23), and H˜aei and H˜bei are defined
in a similar way as h˜ae and h˜be in (8). Problem (20) is a
nonsmooth optimization problem, but can be reformulated as
a smooth one, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Consider the following problem:
min
γ
g(γ),
s.t.
I∑
i=1
γi = 1, γi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I,
(21)
where
g(γ) , max
Wa0,
Tr(Wa)≤Pa
log(1 + hˆHabWahˆab)−
I∑
i=1
γiTr(MiWa).
(22)
Let W ⋆a (γ) be the optimal solution of problem (22) and γ
⋆
be the optimal solution of (21). Then,
1) g(γ) is differentiable w.r.t. γ and ∇g(γ) =
−[Tr(MiW ⋆a (γ)), . . . ,Tr(MIW ⋆a (γ))]T ;
2) the optimal solution of (20) is given by W ⋆a (γ
⋆).
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Since g(γ) is differentiable, the optimal γ⋆ of (21) can
be efficiently computed via the projected gradient descent
method [28], as long as g(γ) and ∇g(γ) can be efficiently
evaluated. Fortunately, for the considered problem (21), g(γ)
and W ⋆a (γ) can be easily computed with the aid of Props. 1
and 2, if one notices that problem (22) is exactly the same as
problem (13) by replacingMa with
∑I
i=1 γiMi. In addition,
the projection onto the unit simplex in (21) can also be
efficiently performed (in a semi-closed form), say by using
the algorithm in [29].
IV. ROBUST SUM SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
In the previous SSRM design, we have implicitly assumed
perfect knowledge of Eve’s CSIs. However, in practice it may
not be easy to acquire the exact CSI. In this section, we relax
this assumption and consider a robust SSRM design under
imperfect CSI of Eve.
A. CSI Uncertainty Model and Robust SSRM Formulation
As mentioned in Introduction, we focus on a moment-based
random CSI model — Eve’s CSIs hae and hbe are randomly
and independently distributed over the measurable space CN .
We have only some rough estimate of the first and the second-
order moment information about hae and hbe, but the exact
distribution or other high-order statistics of hae and hbe are
not known. A more precise mathematical description of the
above moment-based uncertain CSI model is as follows. Let
ξi ∈ CN and Ωi ∈ HN+ be the estimates of the first and
the second-order moments of hie for i ∈ {a, b}, resp. The
roughness of these estimates is characterized by the following
inequalities: { ‖E[hie]− ξi‖2 ≤ τi,1, (24a)
‖E[hiehHie ]−Ωi‖2 ≤ τi,2, (24b)
for i ∈ {a, b}. Herein, ‖ · ‖2 denotes either ℓ2 norm for vector
input or spectral norm for matrix input; τi,1 ≥ 0 and τi,2 ≥
0 are given constants, specifying how accurate the first and
the second-order moments are. In particular, τi,1 = τi,2 = 0
corresponds to ideal estimation. Notice that given ξi,Ωi, τi,1
and τi,2, there are in general infinite number of distributions
fulfilling (24). In other words, the true distribution of hie,
denoted by Fi for i ∈ {a, b}, lies in an uncertainty set, i.e.,
Fi ∈ D(ξi,Ωi, τi,1, τi,2), i ∈ {a, b}, (25)
where D(ξi,Ωi, τi,1, τi,2) denotes the set of distributions that
fulfills (24).
Under the above uncertain CSI model, the robust SSRM
problem is formulated as an outage-probability constrained
secrecy rate maximization problem, viz.,
max
Qa,Qb,Rs
Rs (26a)
s.t. min
Fa∈D(ξa,Ωa,τa,1,τa,2)
Fb∈D(ξb,Ωb,τb,1,τb,2)
Phae∼Fa
hbe∼Fb
{Ra +Rb −Re ≥ Rs}
≥ 1− ǫ, (26b)
Tr(Qa) ≤ Pa, Tr(Qb) ≤ Pb, Qa  0, Qb  0,
(26c)
where Ra, Rb and Re are defined in (2)-(4); for notational
convenience, we have dropped the arguments (Qa,Qb) in Ra,
Rb and Re; ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is the outage probability, specifying the
chance of the sum secrecy rate falling below Rs when hae
and hbe vary randomly according to certain distributions Fa
and Fb, resp. Since the exact distributions of hae and hbe
7are not available, to be safe, the constraint (26b) requires
that the secrecy outage probability should be kept below
ǫ for arbitrary distributions Fa ∈ D(ξa,Ωa, τa,1, τa,2) and
Fb ∈ D(ξb,Ωb, τb,1, τb,2). The constraint (26b) is meaningful
in the sense of protecting transmission security and achieving
maximal robustness against Eve’s CSI uncertainty. However,
from an optimization perspective, it also poses a challenging
task, since it involves infinite number of distributions. In the
following, we develop a tractable solution to problem (26)
by leveraging the Lagrangian duality theory and the DC
programming.
B. A Tractable Safe Solution to the Robust SSRM Problem
Since hae and hbe appear only in Re, problem (26) can be
recast as
max
Qa,Qb,νe
Ra +Rb − log(1 + νe) (27a)
s.t. max
Fa∈D(ξa,Ωa,τa,1,τa,2)
Fb∈D(ξb,Ωb,τb,1,τb,2)
Phae∼Fa
hbe∼Fb


∑
i∈{a,b}
hHieQihie ≥ σ2eνe


≤ ǫ, (27b)
Tr(Qa) ≤ Pa, Tr(Qb) ≤ Pb, Qa  0, Qb  0, νe ≥ 0,
(27c)
where we have made a change of variable log(1 + νe) =
Ra +Rb −Rs. Clearly, the main difficulty arises from (27b),
which is a worst-case probabilistic constraint. In general, it
is unlikely to express this worst-case probabilistic constraint
into an explicit form. Herein, we focus on finding a safe ap-
proximation to (27b), i.e., by replacing (27b) with a relatively
easy-to-handle constraint so that every solution of the latter
must fulfill (27b). Following this idea, let us summarize our
main result on the safe approximation of (27) in the following
theorem. The proof of the theorem is provided in the next
subsection.
Theorem 1 Consider the following problem:
max Ra(Qa,Qb) +Rb(Qa,Qb)− log(1 + νe)
s.t.
∑
i∈{a,b}
Tr(ΓiΨi +ΦiΞi) + αi ≤ ǫµ,

2Ba λa2Bb λb
λHa λ
H
b −(αa + αb)

  0,

2Ba +Qa λa2Bb +Qb λb
λHa λ
H
b µ− αa − αb − σ2eνe

  0,
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi, Qi  0, Γi  0, Φi  0, i ∈ {a, b},
Γi =
[
Si λi
λHi θi
]
, Φi =
[
Ai Bi
Bi Ci
]
, i ∈ {a, b},
µ ≥ 0, νe ≥ 0, αi ∈ R, i ∈ {a, b},
(28)
where ({Qi, αi,Γi,Φi,Si,λi, θi,Ai,Bi,Ci}i∈{a,b}, νe, µ)
are optimization variables, and
Ψi ,
[
τi,1I −ξi
−ξHi τi,1
]
, Ξi ,
[
τi,2I −Ωi
−Ωi τi,2I
]
, i ∈ {a, b}
are constant matrices. Then, problem (28) is a safe approxi-
mation of the robust SSRM problem (26); i.e., any solution of
problem (28) is a feasible solution of problem (26).
In (28), the constraints are already convex and the objective
can be written into a DC form:
Ra(Qa,Qb) +Rb(Qa,Qb)− log(1 + νe)
=ϕ1(Qa,Qb)− ϕ2(Qa,Qb, νe)
where
ϕ1(Qa,Qb) , log(σ
2
a + ζah
H
aaQahaa + h
H
baQbhba)
+ log(σ2b + ζbh
H
bbQbhbb + h
H
abQahab)
ϕ2(Qa,Qb, νe) , log(1 + νe) + log(σ
2
a + ζah
H
aaQahaa)
+ log(σ2b + ζbh
H
bbQbhbb).
Therefore, again the DC programming can be employed to
iteratively solve problem (28). Moreover, by applying the clas-
sical DC convergence result [23, Theorem 1], we immediately
conclude that every limit point generated by DC programm is
a stationary solution of problem (28).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Our idea is to replace the left-hand side (LHS) of (27b) with
its upper bound, so that after the replacement the resultant
constraint is easier to handle than (27b). Since the LHS of
(27b) is the maximization of some probability measure, it can
be upper bounded by its dual optimal value by the Lagrangian
duality theory. As such, the main endeavor in the sequel is to
develop the dual of the maximization on the LHS of (27b).
To start, letA , {(hae,hbe) |
∑
i∈{a,b} h
H
ieQihie ≥ σ2eνe}
and denote by IA(hae,hbe) the indicator function over the set
A, i.e.,
IA(hae,hbe) =
{
1, if (hae,hbe) ∈ A,
0, otherwise.
(29)
Then, the outage probability in (27b) can be expressed as
Phae∼Fa
hbe∼Fb


∑
i∈{a,b}
hHieQihie ≥ σ2eνe


=E {IA(hae,hbe)}
=
∫ ∫
IA(hae,hbe)dFa(hae)dFb(hbe).
(30)
Recalling the definition of D in (25), the maximization on
the LHS of (27b) can be written as the following constrained
optimization problem w.r.t. the distributions Fa and Fb:
max
Fa,Fb
∫ ∫
IA(hae,hbe)dFa(hae)dFb(hbe) (31a)
s.t.
∥∥∥∥
∫
hiedFi(hie)− ξi
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ τi,1, i ∈ {a, b}, (31b)∥∥∥∥
∫
hieh
H
iedFi(hie)−Ωi
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ τi,2, i ∈ {a, b},
(31c)∫
dFi(hie) = 1, i ∈ {a, b}. (31d)
8The constraint in (31b) is a second-order cone constraint,
which can be reexpressed as the following linear matrix
inequality (LMI) by using the Schur complement lemma [31,
Lemma 4.2.1]:∫ [
τi,1I hie − ξi
(hie − ξi)H τi,1
]
dFi  0
⇐⇒
∫ [
0 hie
hHie 0
]
dFi(hie) 
[−τi,1I ξi
ξHi −τi,1
]
, i ∈ {a, b}.
(32)
Meanwhile, the spectral norm constraint in (31c) can also be
expressed as an LMI by noting the following equivalence [31]:
‖X‖2 ≤ τ ⇐⇒
[
τIM X
XH τIN
]
 0
for any matrix X ∈ CM×N and τ ≥ 0. Therefore, the
constraint (31c) can be rewritten as∫ [
τi,2I hieh
H
ie −Ωi
hieh
H
ie −Ωi τi,2I
]
dFi(hie)  0
⇐⇒
∫ [
0 hieh
H
ie
hieh
H
ie 0
]
dFi(hie) 
[−τi,2I Ωi
Ωi −τi,2I
]
(33)
for all i ∈ {a, b}. By substituting (32) and (33) into (31),
problem (31) can be equivalently written as
max
Fa,Fb
∫ ∫
IA(hae,hbe)dFa(hae)dFb(hbe)
s.t. (31d), (32), (33) satisfied.
(34)
Next, we derive the Lagrangian dual of problem (34). Let
α¯i ∈ R, Γ¯i =
[
S¯i λ¯i
λ¯Hi θ¯i
]
 0, and Φ¯i =
[
A¯i B¯i
B¯i C¯i
]
 0
for i ∈ {a, b} be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with
(31d), (32) and (33), respectively. Then, the Lagrangian of
problem (34) can be expressed as
L =
∫ ∫
IA(hae,hbe)dFa(hae)dFb(hbe)
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
α¯i(1−
∫
dFi(hie))
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
∫
Γ¯i •
[
0 hie
hHie 0
]
dFi(hie) +
∑
i∈{a,b}
Γ¯i •Ψi
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
∫
Φ¯i •
[
0 hieh
H
ie
hieh
H
ie 0
]
dFi(hie)
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
Φ¯i •Ξi
=
∫ ∫ {
IA(hae,hbe) +
∑
i∈{a,b}
(−α¯i + 2Re{λ¯Hi hie}
+2hHieB¯ihie
)}
dFa(hae)dFb(hbe)
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
(Γ¯i •Ψi + Φ¯i •Ξi + α¯i)
(35)
where for notational simplicity, we have denoted A • B ,
Tr(AHB) and
Ψi ,
[
τi,1I −ξi
−ξHi τi,1
]
, Ξi ,
[
τi,2I −Ωi
−Ωi τi,2I
]
, i ∈ {a, b}.
Therefore, the dual of problem (34) is given by
min
{α¯i,Γ¯i,Φ¯i}i∈{a,b}
∑
i∈{a,b}
Γ¯i •Ψi + Φ¯i •Ξi + α¯i (36a)
s.t. IA(hae,hbe) +
∑
i∈{a,b}
2Re{λ¯Hi hie}
+ 2hHieB¯ihie − α¯i ≤ 0, ∀ hae,hbe ∈ CN , (36b)
Γ¯i  0, Φ¯i  0, i ∈ {a, b}. (36c)
To express the constraint (36b) into a more tractable form,
let us define
B¯ = 2Diag(B¯a, B¯b), λ¯ = [λ¯
T
a , λ¯
T
b ]
T , he = [h
T
ae, h
T
be]
T .
Recalling the definition of IA(hae,hbe) in (29), it is clear that
(36b) holds if and only if

[
he
1
]H[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H −(α¯a + α¯b)
][
he
1
]
≤ 0, ∀he ∈ CN (37a)[
he
1
]H[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H −(α¯a + α¯b − 1)
][
he
1
]
≤ 0, ∀he ∈ A(37b)
For (37a), the quadratic inequality holds for any vector he ∈
CN if and only if[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H −(α¯a + α¯b)
]
 0. (38)
For (37b), it amounts to the following implication:[
he
1
]H [
Q 0
0
H −σ2eνe
] [
he
1
]
≥ 0 =⇒
[
he
1
]H [
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H −(α¯a + α¯b − 1)
] [
he
1
]
≤ 0
(39)
for any he, where Q , Diag(Qa, Qb). Since both sides of
the above implication are quadratic w.r.t. he, it follows from
the S-procedure [31] that the implication (39) holds if and
only if the following matrix inequality is true:[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H 1− α¯a − α¯b
]
+ µ¯
[
Q 0
0
H −σ2eνe
]
 0 (40)
for some slack variable µ¯ ≥ 0.
Now, by substituting (38) and (40) into (36), the dual of
problem (34) can be written into a more compact form:
min
µ¯,{α¯i,Γ¯i,Φ¯i}
∑
i∈{a,b}
Γ¯i •Ψi + Φ¯i •Ξi + α¯i (41a)
s.t.
[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H −(α¯a + α¯b)
]
 0, (41b)[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H 1− α¯a − α¯b
]
+ µ¯
[
Q 0
0
H −σ2eνe
]
 0,
(41c)
Γ¯i  0, Φ¯i  0, i ∈ {a, b}, µ¯ ≥ 0. (41d)
9From the duality theory, we know that the optimal value of
problem (34) or equally the LHS of (27b) is upper bounded
by the optimal value of problem (41). Hence, we arrive at the
following key result:
Claim 1 The outage probability constraint (27b) holds if the
optimal value of problem (41) is no greater than ǫ.
We should mention that Claim 1 states only a sufficient, but
not necessary condition for fulfilling the constraint (27b). This
is because there may exist duality gap between problem (34)
and its dual (41). Also notice that the optimal value of (41)
is no greater than ǫ if and only if there exists some feasible
point of (41) such that the corresponding objective value in
(41a) is no greater than ǫ. Consequently, a safe approximation
of problem (26) is readily obtained by replacing the LHS of
(27b) with (41a) and adding (41b)-(41d) into the constraints
of (27), viz.,
max
{Qi,α¯i,Γ¯i,Φ¯i}i
νe,µ¯
Ra(Qa,Qb) +Rb(Qa,Qb)− log(1 + νe)
(42a)
s.t.
∑
i∈{a,b}
Tr(Γ¯iΨi + Φ¯iΞi) + α¯i ≤ ǫ, (42b)
[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H −(α¯a + α¯b)
]
 0, (42c)[
B¯ λ¯
λ¯H 1− α¯a − α¯b
]
+ µ¯
[
Q 0
0
H −σ2eνe
]
 0, (42d)
Tr(Qi) ≤ Pi,Qi  0, Γ¯i  0, Φ¯i  0, i ∈ {a, b}, (42e)
µ¯ ≥ 0, νe ≥ 0. (42f)
Notice that all the constraints in (42) are convex w.r.t. the
optimization variables except for (42d), where µ¯ is coupled
with Q and νe. To turn (42d) into a convex constraint, we
make use of the following observation:
Observation 1 Any feasible µ¯ of problem (42) must be strictly
positive.
The proof of Observation 1 can be found in Appendix D.
Since µ¯ > 0, we make the following change of variables:
Φi = Φ¯i/µ¯, Γi = Γ¯i/µ¯, αi = α¯i/µ¯, µ = 1/µ¯,
and reexpress problem (42) as problem (28). This completes
the proof of Theorem 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate
the performances of the proposed designs under both perfect
and imperfect CSI cases. We will first consider the perfect CSI
case in the first subsection, and then the imperfect CSI case
in the second subsection.
A. The Perfect CSI Case
The results to be presented in this subsection are based on
the following simulation settings, unless otherwise specified:
The number of transmit antennas at Alice and Bob are N = 4;
all the receive noises have zero mean and unit variance. For
simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob have the same SI
residual factor ζa = ζb = ζ = 0.01, and the same transmit
power Pa = Pb = P = 5 dB. All the channels were randomly
generated following i.i.d. complex Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and unit variance.
Fig. 2 shows convergence behaviors of the ADC algorithm
for one randomly generated problem instance. From the figure
we see that the ADC algorithm converges quickly within 3
iterations. After the first two iterations, Eve’s rate can be
largely suppressed from the initial three bits/s/Hz to nearly
zero, and meanwhile, Alice and Bob’s rates are improved.
Fig. 3 plots the secrecy rate against the transmit power P
at Alice and Bob under various designs. In the legend, “FD-
DC” represents the proposed ADC approach, cf. Algorithm 1;
“HD-DC” represents the conventional half-duplex (HD) bidi-
rectional transmissions, which suffers from a rate reduction by
half. “FD-ZF” is similar to “FD-DC”, except that the transmit
covariance matrices Qa and Qb are enforced in the null space
of their respective SI channels, so that the residual SI can
be completely eliminated at the cost of one spatial degree
of freedom (d.o.f.) loss per transmitter. Owing to the zero-
forcing (ZF) constraints, the subproblems in (9) and (10) are
degenerated into the secrecy design problem for the MISOME
wiretap channel in [32], and the optimal solution can be ob-
tained through generalized eigenvalue decomposition; readers
are referred to [32] for details. From the figure we see that
FD-DC attains the best rate performance among the three
designs, and that FD transmission is in general better than HD.
Moreover, with the increase of the SI residual factor ζ, FD-
DC gets closer to FD-ZF, especially for large transmit power.
This is because large ζ and P may incur significant SI, which
would offset the d.o.f. gain of FD-DC.
Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the sum secrecy rates
and the number of transmit antennas for different designs.
From Fig. 4, we see that with the increase of the transmit
antennas, the secrecy rates of all methods increase. Specifi-
cally, for small number of antennas, there are notable rate gaps
between FD-DC and the other two designs. For large number
of antennas, FD-ZF is able to approach FD-DC, because of
the negligible spatial d.o.f. loss by ZF. In addition, HD-DC is
far inferior to the other two FD-based designs, owing to the
half reduction of the rate induced by the HD transmissions.
B. The Imperfect CSI Case
In the next two examples, we consider the imperfect CSI
case. The simulation settings are basically identical to those
of the perfect CSI case, i.e., N = 4, σ2a = σ
2
b = σ
2
e = 1,
ζa = ζb = ζ = 0.01 and Pa = Pb = P = 5 dB. The
secrecy outage probability threshold is set to ǫ = 5%. As for
the CSI uncertainty model, we set the estimated mean ξa =
ξb = ξ = 0.01 × (1N +
√−11N ), the estimated second-
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order moment Ωa = Ωb = Ω = ξξ
H + ρIN , and τi,1 = τ1,
τi,2 = τ2, i ∈ {a, b} for simplicity.
Example 1) Exact moment case: We first test the robustness
of the proposed robust DC design under the exact moment
case via setting τ1 = τ2 = 0. For comparison, we also
run the ADC Algorithm 1 with the estimated mean; i.e., by
replacing hie, i ∈ {a, b} in problems (9) and (10) with the
estimated mean ξi, i ∈ {a, b}. After convergence, we obtain
some secrecy rate value RADCs and the transmit solution
(QADCa ,Q
ADC
b ). Then, we use the solution (Q
ADC
a ,Q
ADC
b )
to perform the subsequent tests. Since it is unlikely to gen-
erate all possible distributions in D(ξ,Ω, 0, 0), we consider
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate histograms under different distributions (τ1 = τ2 =
0, ρ = 0.002) (a) Nonrobust ADC design with estimated mean, and (b)
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four representative distributions, namely, Gaussian distribu-
tion, binary distribution, uniform distribution and Laplace
distribution. Our test is conducted as follows: Suppose that
we have obtained a transmit solution (Qa,Qb) by either
ADC or robust DC. Then, we randomly generate 105 Eve’s
channel realizations for each of the four distributions, and
calculate the secrecy rate Rj,ts (Qa,Qb) for the tth channel
realization of the type j = 1, . . . , 4 distribution. After ob-
taining all Rj,ts (Qa,Qb) for each j, we plot the histograms
of Rj,ts (Qa,Qb) for j = 1, . . . , 4. Fig. 5(a) shows the
histograms of Rj,ts (Q
ADC
a ,Q
ADC
b ), where the red circled line
corresponds to the secrecy rate value RADCs obtained from
Algorithm 1. From the figure, we see that for most channel
realizations, the empirical secrecy rate is below RADCs ; that
is, the ADC design suffers from severe secrecy outage, and
cannot provide satisfactory transmission security because of
ignoring CSI imperfection. Fig. 5(b) shows the result of the
robust DC. Clearly, all the empirical secrecy rates of the robust
DC are above the secrecy rate threshold obtained from (28),
and thus no secrecy outage happens under the four tested
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Fig. 7. Secrecy rate histograms under different distributions (τ1 = τ2 = 0.05,
ρ = 0.002) (a) Robust DC based on estimated moments, and (b) Robust DC
with moment uncertainty.
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Fig. 8. Empirical outage probability of the robust DCs with and without
considering moment uncertainty for the first 20 channel realizations
distributions. Fig. 5(a) and (b) are obtained from one randomly
generated problem instance. To further evaluate the robustness,
we repeated the above test for 20 randomly generated problem
instances, and plotted the worst outage probability (among the
four distributions) of the two designs in Fig. 6. As seen, the
outage probability of the ADC algorithm is far higher than the
desired threshold 5%, whereas the robust DC is always below
the threshold.
Example 2) Uncertain moment case: In this example, we test
the performance of the robust DC under moment uncertainty
via setting τ1 = τ2 = 0.05. Similar to Example 1, we compare
two robust DC designs: One is based on the estimated moment
information without considering the moment uncertainty, i.e.,
by presuming τ1 = τ2 = 0; the other takes into account
the moment uncertainty. Fig. 7 shows the histograms of the
two robust designs under different distributions. As seen, by
slightly perturbing the first and the second-order moments,
the performance of the robust DC design without considering
moment uncertainty degrades significantly — for most channel
realizations, secrecy outage happens. This is in sharp contrast
to the previous example in Fig. 5(b), where no secrecy outage
happens when the moment information is accurately estimated.
For the robust DC with considering moment uncertainty in
Fig. 7(b), its empirical secrecy rates are all above the rate
threshold, thereby no secrecy outage occurring. Similar to
Fig. 6, we also tested the outage probability of the two robust
DCs for 20 randomly generated problem instances and the
result is shown in Fig. 8. We see that the robust DC with-
out considering moment uncertainty has only seven problem
instances with secrecy outage probability ≤ 5%, whereas the
design with considering moment uncertainty keeps the secrecy
outage probability below 5%.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has considered transmit covariances optimiza-
tion for maximizing the sum secrecy rate (SSR) of a full-
duplex bidirectional communication system. Both perfect and
imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper are considered. For the
former, we developed an alternating DC (ADC) programming
approach to maximizing the sum secrecy rate, and estab-
lished its stationary solution convergence. For the latter, we
developed a tractable safe approximation to the robust SSR
maximization by leveraging the Lagrangian duality theory and
the DC programming. Simulation results demonstrated that our
proposed designs can achieve a better secrecy rate performance
and provide desired robustness against CSI imperfection.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The inner maximization in (15) amounts to
max
Wa0
log(1 + hˆHabWahˆab)− Tr((Ma + λaI)Wa).
By making a change of variable
W˘a = (Ma + λaI)
1/2Wa(Ma + λaI)
1/2, (43)
the above maximization can be further rewritten as
max
W˘a0
log(1 + h˘HabW˘ah˘ab)− Tr(W˘a), (44)
where h˘ab , (Ma + λaI)
−1/2hˆab. Note that
h˘HabW˘ah˘ab ≤ Tr(W˘a)‖h˘ab‖2.
Therefore,
log(1 + h˘HabW˘ah˘ab)− Tr(W˘a)
≤ log(1 + Tr(W˘a)‖h˘ab‖2)− Tr(W˘a)
≤ max
Tr(W˘a)≥0
log(1 + Tr(W˘a)‖h˘ab‖2)− Tr(W˘a)
= log
(
1 + [‖h˘ab‖2 − 1]+
)− [1− 1/‖h˘ab‖2]+,
where the last equality holds when Tr(W˘a) =
[
1 −
1/‖h˘ab‖2
]+
. Clearly, the above upper bound is achieved if
and only if
W˘a =
[
1− 1/‖h˘ab‖2
]+
‖h˘ab‖2
h˘abh˘
H
ab (45)
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in (44). That is, (45) gives the optimal solution for prob-
lem (44), or equivalently optimalWa for the inner maximiza-
tion in (15) via the relation (43).
Next, we derive the upper bound on the dual optimal
λ⋆a. Since λ
⋆
a > 0 implies Tr(W
⋆
a ) = Pa, we must have
κa > 0 and thus ‖(Ma + λ⋆aI)−1/2hˆab‖2 > 1. Notice
that ‖(Ma + λ⋆aI)−1/2hˆab‖2 = hˆHab(Ma + λ⋆aI)−1hˆab ≤
hˆHab(λ
⋆
aI)
−1hˆab = (λ
⋆
a)
−1‖hˆab‖2. Therefore, we arrive at
(λ⋆a)
−1‖hˆab‖2 > 1, i.e., λ⋆a < ‖hˆab‖2. Moreover, it is
known that Tr (W ⋆a ) is a nonincreasing function w.r.t. λ
⋆
a [30,
Sec. 13.1, Lemma 1], i.e., the larger λ⋆a leads to the smaller
Tr (W ⋆a ), and vice versa. Hence, the optimal λ
⋆
a can be effi-
ciently computed via bisection over the interval (0, ‖hˆab‖2)
such that the complementarity condition is satisfied.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Since problems (11) and (12) both have compact feasible
sets, the iterates {(W ka ,W kb )}k generated by Algorithm 1
must be bounded. By the Weierstrass theorem {(W ka ,W kb )}k
contains at least one limit point. To establish the second part of
the proposition, we show that Algorithm 1 is a special case of
the BSUM algorithm in [23], and the convergence result of the
latter applies. For self-containedness, let us first briefly review
the BSUM algorithm. Consider the following maximization
problem1:
max
x∈Rm
g(x)
s.t. x ∈ X , X1 × . . .×Xn,
(46)
where x = (x1, . . . ,xn),
∑n
i=1mi = m and Xi ⊆ Rmi is the
feasible set for the ith block variable. The BSUM algorithm
for (46) is summarized in the following procedure.
1: Find a feasible point x0 ∈ X and set k = 0
2: repeat
3: k = k + 1, i = (r mod n) + 1
4: Let
X k = arg max
xi∈Xi
ui(xi,x
k−1) (47)
5: Set xki to be an arbitrary element in X k
6: Set xkℓ = x
k−1
ℓ , ∀ ℓ 6= i
7: until some stopping criterion is met
In line 4, the function ui : R
mi 7→ R is a surrogate function
used for updating the ith block variable. In particular, ui(·, ·)
satisfies the following key properties:
1) ui(yi;y) = g(y), ∀ y ∈ X , ∀ i,
2) ui(xi;y) ≤ g(y1, . . . ,yi−1,xi,yi+1, . . . ,yn), ∀ xi ∈
Xi, ∀ y ∈ X , ∀ i,
3) u′i(xi,y;di) = g
′(y;d), ∀ d = (0, . . . ,di, . . . ,0) s.t.
yi+di ∈ Xi, ∀ i, where u′i and g′ denote the directional
derivatives of ui and g along the directions di and d,
resp.,
4) ui(xi,y) is continuous in (xi,y), ∀ i.
The following convergence result was established in [23,
Theorem 2].
1The original BSUM considers a minimization problem; herein we changed
the minimization as maximization to fit into our context.
Theorem 2 ([23]) Suppose that the function ui(xi,y) is
quasi-concave in xi for i = 1, . . . , n. Furthermore, assume
that the subproblem (47) has a unique solution for any point
xk−1 ∈ X . Then, every limit point z of the iterates generated
by the BSUM algorithm is a coordinatewise minimum of (46).
In addition, if g(·) is regular2 at z, then z is a stationary point
of (46).
Now, we establish the second part of the proposition by
verifying that the ADC algorithm fulfills the conditions re-
quired by Theorem 2. First of all, since fa(Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b )
is obtained by keeping the concave part R˜a(Wa,W
k
b ) and
linearizing the convex part R˜b(Wa,W
k
b )− R˜e(Wa,W kb ). It
can be easily verified that fa(Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b ) is concave and
satisfies the following properties:
1) fa(Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b ) ≤ R˜a(Wa,W kb ) + R˜b(Wa,W kb ) −
R˜e(Wa,W
k
b ) for all feasible Wa,
2) fa(W
k
a ;W
k
a ,W
k
b ) = R˜a(W
k
a ,W
k
b ) + R˜b(W
k
a ,W
k
b )−
R˜e(W
k
a ,W
k
b ),
3) ∇Wafa(W ka ;W ka ,W kb ) = ∇Wa [R˜a(W ka ,W kb ) +
R˜b(W
k
a ,W
k
b )− R˜e(W ka ,W kb )],
4) fa(Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b ) is continuous in (Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b ).
That is, fa(Wa;W
k
a ,W
k
b ) is a tight lower bound on
R˜a(Wa,W
k
b ) + R˜b(Wa,W
k
b )− R˜e(Wa,W kb ).
Next, we show that the subproblem (11) has a unique
optimal solution. In Proposition 1 and 2, we have derived the
optimal solution W ⋆a , which must be of rank one. Suppose
on the contrary that there are two distinct rank-one optimal
solutions, denoted byW ⋆a,1 andW
⋆
a,2 for problem (11). Then,
their convex combination W˜a = ρW
⋆
a,1+(1−ρ)W ⋆a,2 for any
ρ ∈ (0, 1) must be optimal for problem (11). Let us consider
the following two cases:
1) W ⋆a,1 6= cW ⋆a,2 for any c ≥ 0, i.e., W ⋆a,1 and W ⋆a,2 are
linearly independent. Then, their convex combination W˜a
must be of rank two, which contradicts with the rank-one
solution structure revealed in Proposition 1 and 2.
2) W ⋆a,1 = cW
⋆
a,2 for some c ≥ 0 and c 6= 1, i.e., W ⋆a,1
and W ⋆a,2 are linearly dependent with different scaling.
Then, W˜a = ((c − 1)ρ+ 1)W ⋆a,2. Substituting W˜a into
the objective of (13) yields
g(ρ) , log
(
1 + ((c− 1)ρ+ 1)hˆHabW ⋆a,2hˆab
)
− ((c− 1)ρ+ 1)Tr(MaW ⋆a,2),
which is strictly concave w.r.t. ρ (for fixedW ⋆a,2). Notice
that both g(0) and g(1) correspond to the optimal value
of (13). Hence,
g(ρ) ≤ g(0) = g(1), ∀ ρ ∈ (0, 1). (48)
On the other hand, it follows from the strict concavity of
g(ρ) that
g(ρ) > (1− ρ)g(0) + ρg(1) = g(0), ∀ ρ ∈ (0, 1),
which contradicts with (48).
Therefore, we conclude that the optimal solution for prob-
lem (11) must be unique. Similarly, one can verify that the
2If g is differentiable, then it is automatically regular.
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tight lower bound property and the solution uniqueness also
hold for fb(Wb;W
k+1
a ,W
k
b ). Therefore, the ADC Algo-
rithm 1 fulfills all the conditions of Theorem 2, and conse-
quently Proposition 3 holds.
C. Proof of Proposition 4
For ease of exposition, let us define
ψ(Wa,γ) , log(1 + hˆ
H
abWahˆab)−
I∑
i=1
γiTr(MiWa).
From the definition of g(γ), it holds that
g(γ) = ψ(W ⋆a (γ),γ),
whereW ⋆a (γ) is an optimal solution of problem (22). There-
fore, for any feasible γ and γ¯ we have
g(γ¯) = ψ(W ⋆a (γ¯), γ¯)
≥ ψ(W ⋆a (γ), γ¯)
= ψ(W ⋆a (γ),γ) −
∑I
i=1 Tr(MiW
⋆
a (γ))
T (γ¯i − γi)
= g(γ)−∑Ii=1Tr(MiW ⋆a (γ))(γ¯i − γi).
That is, −[Tr(M1W ⋆a (γ)), . . . ,Tr(MIW ⋆a (γ))] is a subgra-
dient of g(γ) at the point γ. Moreover, given γ, problem (22)
takes a similar form as (13) by treating
∑I
i=1 γiMi as Ma
in (13). Hence, the optimal W ⋆a (γ) of problem (22) must
be of rank one and unique according to the uniqueness
proof in Appendix B. Now, it follows from Danskin’s the-
orem [28] that g(γ) is differentiable, and the subgradient
−[Tr(M1W ⋆a (γ)), . . . ,Tr(MIW ⋆a (γ))] is automatically the
gradient of g(γ) at γ.
To prove the second part, notice that
min
i=1,...,I
log(1 + hˆHabWahˆab)− Tr(MiWa)
= min
γi≥0,∀i, γT 1=1
log(1 + hˆHabWahˆab)−
I∑
i=1
γiTr(MiWa),
= min
γi≥0,∀i, γT 1=1
ψ(Wa,γ).
Problem (20) can be rewritten as
max
Wa0,Tr(Wa)≤Pa
min
γi≥0,∀i,γT1=1
ψ(Wa,γ). (49)
Since Wa and γ lie in the compact sets, and ψ(Wa,γ) is
convex in γ and concave in Wa, it follows from Sion’s max-
min theorem [27] that the maximization and the minimization
in (49) can be exchanged without sacrificing optimality. Thus,
problem (49) is equivalent to
min
γi≥0,∀i,γT 1=1
{
max
Wa0,Tr(Wa)≤Pa
ψ(Wa,γ)
}
. (50)
Using the definition of g(γ) yields the desired result in (21).
D. Proof of Observation 1
Notice thatΨi and Ξi are both positive semidefinite; hence,∑
i∈{a,b} Tr(Γ¯iΨi + Φ¯iΞi) ≥ 0, which together with (42b)
implies that
α¯a + α¯b ≤ ǫ < 1. (51)
Let us suppose on the contrary µ¯ = 0. It follows from (42d)
that 1− α¯a − α¯b ≤ 0, i.e.,
α¯a + α¯b ≥ 1,
which contradicts with (51).
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